The Budget yesterday included an important update to the remit of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). Depending on who you listen to, this is either an important change that could offer a considerable additional stimulus to the UK economy, or a major disappointment. So which is it?
The document reaffirms flexible inflation targeting, and rejects alternatives such as nominal GDP targets. However the Treasury wants to make it clear to the MPC just how flexible it can be. It can, for example, ‘see through’ (i.e. ignore) any short term increase in inflation for a lot longer than the two years that has so far been part of the MPC’s mantra. It can create ‘intermediate thresholds’ as part of forward guidance. In short, it believes flexible inflation targeting is quite compatible with the MPC doing what the US Fed is currently doing. [1]
I think Britmouse has it exactly right when he writes:
“I see nothing at all in the new remit text which compels the MPC to do anything different to current policy. It is all about judgement. Neither did the old remit prevent the MPC from giving forward guidance if they so desired.”
To see why this is important, read the minutes just released of the last MPC meeting, where the committee voted 6 to 3 not to undertake any further Quantitative Easing. In para 27 it sets out the arguments for providing more stimulus, which include:
“inflation expectations were relatively stable; wage growth remained weak; there remained a degree of slack in the economy; and the potentially positive response of supply capacity to increased demand meant that higher output growth would not necessarily lead to any material increase in inflationary pressure”
Which all sounds pretty compelling. But then the next paragraph sets out the reasons for doing nothing, which basically boil down to
“Inflation was above the 2% target and was likely to stay above it for an extended period, and there was a risk that could lead to inflation expectations drifting upwards with adverse consequences for wage and price setting behaviour. Further monetary stimulus might increase that risk. It might also lead to an unwarranted depreciation of sterling if it were misinterpreted as a lack of commitment to maintaining low inflation in the medium term”
In other words, any attempt to use the very flexibility that the Treasury emphasises the MPC has risks a loss in the credibility of the medium term inflation target. So 6 of the 9 member committee decided it was best not take take that risk. I cannot see anything in the new guidance issued by the Treasury yesterday that would have influenced any of the 6 who voted to do nothing to change their minds.
Now I guess the Treasury is hoping that the new governor will persuade some on the committee to vote the other way (although note that the current governor was one of the minority who voted for additional stimulus). But surely the key question is why they need persuading in the first place. Why are possible risks to the credibility of the medium term inflation target allowed to outweigh the current almost 100% certainty that we have chronic demand deficiency which no one else is going to do anything to change. Perhaps a remit that places medium term inflation stability at its core, and says nothing about eliminating demand deficiency, might just have something to do with it.
[1] In addition, it also believes that flexible inflation targeting allows the MPC to consider deviating from the inflation target if there is a “development of imbalances that the FPC may judge to represent a potential risk to financial stability”.
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